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REVIEW
Growth or Development?:
A Review of The Prebisch Report
on Latin America 1
by Dudley Seers 2
When it became Imown that Dr. Prebisch was writing this report,
expectations ran high. Clearly if his many talents were ever
needed anywhere, the time is now and the place Latin America, facing
its most profound crises, What would Prebisch recommend, looking
at the region with a fresh eye after six years based in Geneva?
Reviewing his report is not a task to be imdertaken lightly.
This is, after all, the culminating statement of the author's
career, the latest of a distinguished series which Rail Prebisch
has produced for Latin America and then for the world, first as
Executive Secretary of ECLA and later as Secretary-General of
UNCTAD - combining almost uniquely the roles of diplomat, admini-
strator, theoretician and researcher. He is the greatest living
practitioner, a sort of Beveridge on the international scene, and
he has done more to educate us on development problems than an
other living man, except perhaps (and in rather different ways
Gunnar Myrdal.
For this very reason he has a number of enemies, and I - who
am especially indebted to him - have no wish to provide them with
ammunition, In any case this, his latest report, is not just the
mixture as before. He devotes much more attention than before
to unemployment and income inequalities. The same applies to
policy on population and technical transfers (though with some
ambivalence), and there is a new emphasis on the dangers of
economic tariffs. Interesting, though brief, references are made
Lo the Soviet model and to the economic damage that caii be done by
advertising and by military expenditure. The section on the
political requirements for tackling social problems marks a
lt t tiChange and Development: Latin America s Great Task Inter-
American Development Bank, 1970), I bemefitted from discussions in
the Latin American group at lBS before writing this review, and
from attending a seminar in Santiago on the report, organised by
1DB, ILPES and SID, at which I put forward the main points in this
paper.
2 Dudley Seers is the Director of The Institute of Development
Studies.
particularly welcome step forward for a report published by a
multinational agency.
Bat still it is time, perhaps past time, to raise certain
questions about the basic model he continues to use, onto which all
these new themes are grafted. This model, which serves to
cr'ystallise his philosophy of development, is a familiar one to
students of Dr. Prebisch's work, even though a different main
objective is specified now - to cure unemployment0
Tais requires, the report says, a high growth rate, 8 per
cent for Latin America as a whole by 1980, This in turn implies
rapidly growing import demands; the burden can be eased by
regional integration, but nevertheless the ex ante foreign exchange
'gap' would require a rising inflow of financial resources from
abroad. Prom another point of view, these are needed to supplement
donestic savings. The report concludes that for this 'gap' to be
filled, import substitution and export promotion would need to be
accelerated, and the flow of resources to all ldc's would need to
reach the TJNCTAD-Pearson target of 1 per cent of the developed
countries' gross product by 1975, and Latin America would have to
retain its (15 per cent) share of these flows, and the terms of
a..d would need to become much easier.
The first question is: what is the purpose of refurbishing
gappery? Do regional projections justify such a heavy emphasis?
The message to Latin Americans to accelerate growth (there is much
talk of 'discipline') hardly needs such statistical support.
They must be addressed to the United States (and its affiliates).
But would any calculations on these assumptions provide useful
ammunition for even a sympathetic Washington politician, granted
the U.S. political scene as it is today?
Is this really the right framework, aniway? The crucial
question is whether the main emphasis should be on speeding up
the growth rate or on changing the growth process The logic of
the Preblsch doctrine (a logic I myself once accepted) is that
fast economic growth based on protected industrialisation would
induce the advance of other sectors of the economy and the relief
of social problems, following the pattern of development in
Western Europe and North America.
Actually, the rate of economic growth has in itself not been
unsatisfactory, averagin$ 5.2 per cent for Latin America as a
whole from 1950 to 1968.l Import substitution has made a big
41
1 Actually someone who believes, as Dr. Prebisch does, that the
income distribution is morally wrong, cannot expect real national
income comparisons, using the prices derived from this distribution
as implicit weights, to have much welfare content. Rather oddly,
the reportes output series do not show which year's prices are
(even in principle) being used. This could make a great deal of
difference in a 1950 to 1968 comparison, because commodity prices
in 1950 were severely affected by the recovery from the 1949
recession and the start of the Korean War.
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contribution, especially in the larger economies - partly due to
the influence of the 'Prebinch doctrine', Imports have risen at
a rate of only 3.2 per cent over the same period. In some countries,
industria], complexes have been created which, with all their
imperfections, do make further advances possible. Nevertheless,
the chief social problems remain unsolved; indeed they are in some
ways worse. From the very incomplete information available,
income distribution seems at least as heavily concentrated in the
hands of the rich as it was 20 years ago, and unemployment is
greater, especially in ita 'disguised' forms, The gap between
town and country appears to have actually widened, whether we look
at incomes, education and health services, or facilities such as
electricity and water supplies (though from this particular gener-
alisation we must exclude Argentina and Uruguay - and perhaps
Chile).l
As the report itself shows, the process of growth has been
such that the benefits of industrialisation have not been spread
at all adequately. Moderm sectors have become in many ways more
clos ely linked with foreign countries than with their rural
hinterlands (something which could never have been said of the
growth process of Britain or France); they have developed
consumption patterns and production techniques which reflect
those in far richer economies. With the notable exception of
Cuba,2 foreign companies have played a big part in the import
substitution process, and much of the benefit of the increased
sales of manufactures has flowed abroad, not only in growing
purchases of equipment and components, but also in rising profits
and royalty payments.3 Import substitution prograxmnes have in
fact often been too unseTctive to make much contribution to
relieving the foreign exchange constraint, their primary objective.
Production costs are too high for many of the new factories(strikingly in the automobile industry) to be able to export -
and indeed they can hardly have been established with this aim
in view,4
1 This does raise the question whether an economist from Argentina
or Uruguay may not be tempted - like an Anglo-Saxon economist -
to base his model on his own national experience, though possibly
with less damaging results,
2 There is actually no reference to Cuba (except a demographic
one), This is odd in 1970, in a report on Latin America and of
such generality; Cuba represents one of the two paradigus of
'change and development'.
The paper by Mr, Vaitsos in Vol. 3, No. 1 of the Bulletin is
interesting in this connection.
Many of them would of course disappear if there was genuine
economic integration.
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The other side of the coin, these new industrial plants have
not done much to relieve unemployment either. The diagram,
derived from table 12 in the report,1 shows a relation between
industrial growth (X) and rises in labour productivity () over the
18 years 1950 to 1968, which is astonishingly close if one allows
for statistical weaknesses. The picture it reveals should make
any growthmonger desarollista) pause. A regression band(drawn by eye) has been inserted to b ring out the relationship;
it seems that about three-quarters of any increase in the growth
of industrial output is accounted for by productivity rises
(verifying Verdoorn's Law). Thus in Brazil, a 7 average growth
in industrial output over this period was accompanied by a 5% rise
in labour productivity and only 2% growth in employment; in
Venezuela the corresponding figures were 11, 6 and 4. (only}exico shows a gain in employment more than half the rise in
industrial production).
At the heart of the deepening structural problems of Latin
America lies a process of industrialisation which seems to have
become perverted, based as it is on the production of goods which
do not require much labour. This points to income distribution
and output techniques as places to look for clues.2 These are
certainly not overlooked by Dr. Prebiach, but then the report
covers a wide variety of subjects in one way or another. What
gives away a writer's real concerns is what he attempts to handle
quantitatively (even if only by the use of hypotheses),3 and to
integrate into his central model.
Questions are also raised about the educational systems of
Latin America; these have apparently failed to induce more
appropriate consumption patterns and attitudes to work or to
provide the skilled manpower needed in various sectors ducation
has always been neglected in Dr. Prebisch's frame of analysis;
this seems especially conspicuous now, in view of the amount of
research done in this field in the 1960's.
To question a diagnosis is naturally to question the pre-
scription - broadly speaking, a bigger dose of Dr. Prebisch's
remedy, growth. First there is a major question about the
1 Countries showing productivity declines have been excluded,
and also Panama, for which the data in the table are internally
inconsistent.
2 These issues are discussed in the report of an inter-agency
mission to Colombia under ILO auspices - "Towards Full Employment"
(ILO 1970), See also Bulletin, Vol. 2 No. 4.
income distribution is only analysed quantitatively in so far
as it affects savings capacity - whereas a structural approach
really requires quantification of the implications for the pattern
of consumption.
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plausibility of the projections in view of past experience,1
especially the realism of expecting industrialisation to make
a much bigger impression on unemployment than it did in the past.
Ceitral to Dr0 Prebisch's thesis is the assumption (table 16 of
tee Report) that by 1 979-80 a growth of industrial output of 9.7%
wold be accompanied by only a 4% rise in labour productivity,
permitting a 5.5% increase in employment. This is shown on the
diagram as Point A (the alternative projection B is based on
sloer growth). It would involve not merely an acceleration in
inaistrial growth but also a big displacement (to the right of
the regression band relating increases in industrial output and
in productivity, Without such a shift, one would expect a growth
of industrial output at nearly 10% to be associated wjth increased
production of about 6%, and of employment about 3. What
Dr. Prebiach is in fact assuming is a sharp rise in the degree
of labour-intensity of output, throughout Latin America.
Techniques may indeed be shifting - but in the opposite direction
A great deal of new industrial investment is bringing with it
even more capital-intensive, indeed foreign-exchange.-intensive
techniques; in fact many of the luxury products now being
produced can hardly be manufactured in ways that provide much
employment, especially for unskilled labour. In addition, the
concentration of income may still be rising in many countries.
It is odd that these key projections are not derived from,
indeed are quite inconsistent with, the historical data assembled
in the report. The implications of the policy effort required
by Dr. Prebisch's projections may thus be greater than he
recognises. The change he predicates in the development process
can hardly be achieved without, inter alia, a more active
screening of imported technology and a bigger redistribution of
income than the report proposes - in fact without absolute declines
in the real incomes of the rich.
Yet even what is proposed in the report is fairly drastic -
a tighter control on foreign investment and tam policies that
wold only permit the top 5% of the population to increase
coosumption gradually in the next decade. Is this politically
realistic? The new government in Chile appears ready for such
measures - those of Bolivia and Peru, even Colombia, may also be
Is there, however, any prospect at all of other governments
adopting them, especially Brazil (which carries a heavy weight
in regional averages)? Many regimes are in office precisely to
prevent social change.
Such governments can fall, but will the process of development
be transformed and brought more under national control, even to
the extent advocated in the report, without the co-operation of
poiltical forces which would seem so unpalatable to Washington
and Wall Street as to make still more unlikely the increases of
1 One wonders in passing how sensitive the regional import
projections are to different growth rates in different countries.
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aid and foreign investment which are assumed? In fact an outflow
of capital seems a more probable consequence of an opening to the
Left. One need look no further than the recent experience of
Chile.
There are other apparent inconsistencies. Would not the
reforms proposed - of land tenure, taxation, tariff structure,
etc. - almost certainly slow down growth, at least for a few years,
while they were being digested, especially if carried out simul-
taneously? One set of such reforms has certainly had this e.ffect
in Cuba, but the sane could well happen without a revolution, or
even a change of government.
It is understandable that such questions are not usually
posed in the publications of banks.1 (Indeed Dr. Herrera of ThD
was rather courageous to publish a report which goes as far as this
one does). But my query - a sad one to have to ask about a
document to which Dr. Prebisch has put his name - is whether the
central analytical framework he employs, useful as it was in its
time, does not now, in the 1970's, steer attention away from the
real issues.
Surely growth rate targets are less important than social
targets, whether for continents or countries. An rate with
certain patterns of growth, indeed with the existing distributions
by sector and by income bracket, may well mean less development
in the sense I use the word than (say) a 4% growth rate combined
with firm measures to redistribute income.2 Indeed, from what
we Imow of countries in the region with even 6% long-tern growth
rates in the 1950's and 1960ts (such as Jamaica, Trinidad and
Venezuela) it is questionable whether really fast growth can be
achieved without such a heavy concentration on modern parts of
the economy as to induce still greater dependence on foreign
countries, still, greater inequalities, and a continued, or even
accelerated, increase in unemployment. (The rising wage rates
in the leading sectors can, by emulation, inhibit the growth of
other sectors, or actually destroy them). This in turn raises
the question whether fast growth will not, even if it is feasible,
eventually produce political stresses so severe as to bring
itself to an end.
1 One wonders whether it will be very feasible henceforward,
especially in Latin America, to continue to combine operational
and professional careers as Dr. Prebisch has done so successfully
and for so long.
2 It is true that in the case of Colombia, the combined implications
of the targets we suggest for employment, and the guesses made about
productivity imply a growth rate of 8%. However this is not a
target in itself - the emphasis is on the employment targets and the
policies they imply, especially for incomes and technology needed
to reach it. We raise in the report the question whether Colombia
can achieve euch far-reaching changes without reduction (para 844),
but felt we should state the full economic requirements of a full
employment policy.
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There is a curious lack of consistency between Dr, Prebisch's
approaches in the two main fields of his life's work. In the
field of international policy, he has - as shom by his reports
as Secretary-General of TfflCTAD - led the way by directing attention
to the process of growth of the world economy, not its overall
average rate; his work focusses on changes in the world income
distribution, especially on the weaknesses of the mechanisms for
spreading the growth of industrial areas to the 'periphery',
Yet for Latin America his central framework is aggregative,
concentrating on national incomes, indeed total supra-national
incomes covering nineteen nations, and attention is focussed
primarily on the need f r fast overall growth, rather than on the
processes of growth and problems of urban-rural integration. It
is this model that needs change and development.
